Is it “All Change” or “As You Were”? The First Appellate Decision of the Child Focused Court

The first appeal arising from the Child Focused Court ("CFC") model has arrived quickly. In Re C (Child Arrangements Orders; Domestic Abuse; Child Focused Court) [2026] EWCA Civ 1216, handed down on 29 September 2026, the Court of Appeal considered whether cases conducted under the new framework require any different approach to domestic abuse, fact-finding, or welfare evaluation.

The answer, in broad terms, is no.

The judgment is significant not because it reshapes existing principles, but because it demonstrates how established law and authority, particularly PD12J, is intended to operate within the new process. It also contains some very useful observations on necessity and fact-finding which are likely to feature prominently in future private law litigation.

Background

The proceedings concerned four children aged between six and fourteen. The parties separated in 2023.  Earlier proceedings concluded in October 2024 after the father admitted a range of abusive behaviour, including controlling conduct towards the mother, isolating her from family and support networks, physical chastisement of the children, and post-separation conduct which resulted in a harassment complaint.  No fact-finding hearing was required in light of those admissions.  Orders were made providing for supervised direct contact.

The present proceedings arose after difficulties emerged in the operation of those arrangements. The mother alleged that the father continued to undermine her parenting and disregard boundaries that had been put in place. Reliance was placed on matters including the provision of a secret mobile telephone and bank account to the eldest child, alleged breaches of supervision arrangements, and conduct during telephone contact said to be harmful to the children's relationship with their mother.  The father sought enforcement of the existing arrangements together with progression towards unsupervised contact.

Within the Child Focused Court process, a Child Impact Report recommended an end to direct contact. McKendrick J declined to follow that recommendation. Instead, he reduced the frequency and duration of supervised direct contact and terminated telephone contact. The mother appealed.

PD12J Remains Central

One of the clearest messages to emerge from the judgment is that the introduction of the Child Focused Court has not altered the importance of PD12J.

The President described the Practice Direction as:

"a central safeguard within the family justice system in cases involving allegations or findings of domestic abuse" [18].

Nor does the Court lose sight of the position of children affected by abuse. As the President observed:

"Section 3(2) of the DA 2021 expressly recognises as victims in their own right children who see or hear domestic abuse, or who experience its effects" [17].

None of this is new.  What matters is the context in which it is said. The Court was plainly concerned to ensure that the Child Focused Court is not viewed as a process in which issues of domestic abuse become diluted in favour of procedural speed and efficiency.  The judgment makes clear that the same substantive protections continue to apply.

Equally important is the Court's emphasis upon patterns of behaviour. Sir Stephen Cobb P endorsed the now familiar observations of Hayden J in F v M:

"Key to both behaviours is an appreciation of a 'pattern' or 'a series of acts', the impact of which must be assessed cumulatively and rarely in isolation" [22].

That approach will be familiar to anyone practising in this field. What is notable is the Court's decision to restate it at the outset of the first appellate consideration of the Child Focused Court model.

Necessity and Fact-Finding

For many practitioners, the most important part of the judgment is likely to be its treatment of fact-finding.

The Court reiterates that a fact-finding hearing is not an end in itself. The issue is not whether allegations can be proved. The issue is whether findings are required in order to determine the welfare outcome before the court.

The President summarised the position in these terms:

"The question is not whether domestic abuse can be proved in the abstract, but whether findings of a particular incident, course of conduct, or pattern of behaviour are likely to bear upon the court's welfare evaluation" [26].

That theme reaches its clearest expression at [46]: 

“Judges and magistrates should therefore ask themselves at the outset of a case: What is this case really about? What issues are agreed? What is actually in dispute? And then the crucial question – What are the disputed issues which require the court’s determination in order for us to be in a position to make a welfare-based decision?”

The President went on to observe that:

"...if the dispute is about the amount of contact rather than the principle of contact then fact-finding about previous abuse is less likely to be necessary."

That passage is likely to become a standard feature of skeleton arguments in private law cases.

Read as a whole, the judgment suggests that where the essential features of abusive conduct are already admitted or established, advocates seeking a fact-finding hearing will need to explain precisely how the disputed allegations bear upon welfare and risk. It is unlikely to be enough simply to say that further findings can be made.

That reasoning proved fatal to much of the appeal. The Court considered that many of the matters relied upon by the mother had already been accepted by the father or did not require determination before welfare decisions could properly be taken.

Why the Appeal Failed

The mother's principal complaint was that the judge had failed to attach sufficient weight to the father's domestic abuse and had been wrong to depart from the Cafcass recommendation that direct contact should cease.

The difficulty with that submission was that the judge had plainly recognised the seriousness of the abuse. McKendrick J described the case as involving:

"very serious domestic abuse"

and stated:

"I have very much in mind all of those distressing aspects of domestic abuse and emotional abuse; perpetrated both against the children and the mother" [86].

The real issue was not whether abuse had occurred. The issue was how its consequences should be managed.  That distinction lies at the heart of the judgment.  Cases involving serious domestic abuse sometimes generate an assumption that particular welfare outcomes necessarily follow. The Court of Appeal rejected that approach. Findings of abuse may fundamentally shape the welfare evaluation, but they do not dictate a single permissible outcome.  The court must still assess risk, consider available safeguards, and determine whether any continuing relationship can safely be maintained.  McKendrick J concluded that it could. Reduced supervised contact, coupled with the removal of telephone contact, was sufficient to manage the identified risks. The Court of Appeal considered that conclusion comfortably open to him and therefore beyond proper appellate interference.

The Children's Wishes and Feelings

The wishes and feelings of the children featured prominently in the welfare assessment.  All four children expressed a desire to maintain a relationship with their father.

The President acknowledged an important reality:

"The father's abusive behaviour will inevitably have shaped the children's experiences, perceptions and emotional responses, and may therefore have influenced the wishes they expressed" [122].

That observation is significant because it avoids two equally unsatisfactory extremes.  The Court did not ignore the possibility that domestic abuse might shape a child's expressed wishes. Equally, it did not treat those wishes as automatically unreliable.  Rather, the influence of abuse formed part of the welfare analysis itself.  The task remained to evaluate the children's views carefully and decide what weight should properly be attached to them in the circumstances of the individual case.

The Child Impact Report

Another aspect of the judgment likely to attract attention is the Court's treatment of the Child Impact Report.  The criticism was measured but unmistakable. Particular concern was expressed about the absence of any structured analysis of the welfare checklist and the limited consideration given to the consequences of ending an established parental relationship.

As Sir Stephen Cobb P observed:

"One would have expected a careful evaluation of the likely emotional, psychological and developmental consequences for these children of the effective loss of an established parental relationship" [124].

Practitioners will recognise the wider significance of those observations.  Cafcass recommendations often carry considerable weight in private law proceedings.  Re C serves as a reminder, however, that recommendations are only one component of the evidential picture and must withstand the same scrutiny as any other aspect of the welfare analysis.

Appellate Restraint

The question for the Court of Appeal was not whether it would have reached the same conclusion. The question was whether the judge had erred in principle, overlooked material evidence, taken irrelevant matters into account, or reached a conclusion outside the ambit of reasonable discretion.

Once it was accepted that McKendrick J had properly directed himself, addressed the domestic abuse evidence, applied PD12J and conducted the required welfare balancing exercise, the prospects of the appeal were limited.

The President's conclusion was brief:

"The Judge did not, on the facts of this case, fall into error in ordering limited supervised contact between the children and their father" [128].

Section 91(14)

The mother's only success related to the section 91(14) order.

The Court accepted that such an order may, in principle, have been justified on the facts of the case. The difficulty was that the judge had not adequately explained why it was necessary in relation to the mother. To that extent, the appeal succeeded.

Conclusion

Although significant as the first appellate authority on the Child Focused Court model, Re C is likely to be more important for what it says about necessity than for what it says about procedure.  The observations at [46] provide a clear framework for identifying the issues that genuinely require determination before welfare decisions can be made.  Advocates seeking further findings in cases where the substance of abusive behaviour is already established are likely to encounter this judgment regularly.  Equally, those resisting fact-finding applications will find considerable support in the Court's repeated insistence that the purpose of findings must always be examined.

A case to carefully consider, reflect upon and rely upon as the national roll out of the Child Focused Court continues apace.