Financial Remedies in 2025: Sharper lines, stronger signals, and a system preparing for change

Introduction

2025 may be a defining year for the financial remedy jurisdiction—though not because of legislative change. Parliament has been largely silent, whilst the courts have been as active as ever. 

That was until in November, when the Government announced that a comprehensive consultation will launch in spring 2026 which will consider the challenges identified by the Law Commission[1] in relation to the current law on financial provision on divorce. The exact scope and nature of the consultation is yet undefined, but Baroness Levitt, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Ministry of Justice, confirmed the consultation will consider both cohabitation reform along with those issues identified within the Law Commission’s scoping paper, suggesting a wholesale and holistic approach.[2]

What we have seen this year is the system subtly repositioning itself in advance of that political moment, although it is likely unintentional: a sharper boundary around non-matrimonial property; a maturing mini code for nuptial agreements; and a greater willingness to confront conduct. The result is a landscape that feels simultaneously more disciplined yet more strained. The caselaw has done much of the work that legislation has avoided. It is against this backdrop, that the most ambitious review of financial remedies since the 1970s will commence in spring next year. 

Standish: a firmer boundary for sharing

The year’s defining decision is the Supreme Court’s Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26, which offers important guidance on the distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property. The husband had transferred around £80m into the wife’s name for inheritance tax planning. The question was whether this transfer “matrimonialised” the assets.

The Court held it did not. The dispositive factors were purpose and treatment: the assets were moved for tax reasons connected to the children, not as part of the marital partnership. Because they were not used as family property, they retained their non-matrimonial status.

For practitioners, Standish provides a clearer, more structured test and marks a shift towards firmer protection for inherited assets, pre-marital and intergenerational wealth—particularly where restructuring is tax-driven. But it also highlights how interpretive and intricate the sharing principle has become, feeding directly into the policy debate about whether Parliament should now codify the fundamentals. One way could be to adopt a “community property” regime as operates in California and in other jurisdictions throughout the world, providing clear statutory division between what is and is not matrimonial property.[3] 

Nuptial Agreements: the script for future legislation

With binding nuptial agreements a likely centrepiece of the 2026 consultation, the courts have effectively spent 2025 drafting the working rules.

1. PN v SA [2025] EWFC 141

   A 2021 PNA was upheld; a later 2023 agreement was rejected as the product of undue pressure. The court reaffirmed that proper process—time, disclosure, independent advice—remains decisive.

2. FO v PN [2025] EWFC 327 (B)

   HHJ Hess upheld a Deed revoking a PNA, dismissing arguments of misrepresentation. The judgment foregrounds adult autonomy where advice and understanding are present.

3. Helliwell v Entwistle [2025] EWCA Civ 1055

   The CA held a PNA ineffective due to fraudulent non-disclosure: the wife had concealed 73% of her wealth. Because the parties had agreed a disclosure protocol, breach vitiated the agreement ab initio.

Together, these cases establish a de facto “mini code”:

1. binding effect where process is fair,
2. no effect where pressure or dishonesty is proven,
3. disclosure matters, especially when parties expressly contract for it.

This trilogy gives policymakers an almost turnkey model for defining “qualifying nuptial agreements”—and highlights where legislative clarity could reduce future litigation. You would, of course, be forgiven for forgetting the Law Commission has already extensively reported on this issue as long ago as 2014.[4]

Conduct: a move from the margins

Conduct continues to be a highly debated topic following the publication of reports by the Nuffield Foundation[5] and Resolution[6] in late 2024. The forthcoming consultation will almost certainly consider the bounds and limitations of §25(2)(g) and how domestic abuse interacts with needs-based outcomes. In MRU v ECR [2025] EWFC 218 (B), the husband—a long-term victim of serious domestic abuse—became the full-time carer of the parties 3 daughters after the wife’s custodial sentence. The court awarded him 100% of the equity in the former family home. Although the judgment acknowledges §25(2)(g), its core reasoning lies in needs radically reshaped by abuse and imprisonment, an approach aligned with Peel J’s view in N v J [2024] EWFC 184. It is clear conduct is becoming more operationally significant than case law sometimes suggests.

Needs in Constrained Circumstances: disability and illness

Although technically from late 2024, V v V [2024] EWFC 280 (B) and OO v QQ [2025] EWFC 310(B) have shaped some of the 2025 commentary. Both illustrate the court’s willingness, in low and modest asset cases, to prioritise disability or terminal illness, and in certain circumstances override the children’s housing need where resources simply cannot stretch to both. 

Whilst neither case is certified as citeable, these cases reflect the tension at the heart of the current law: flexibility allows humane outcomes, but the absence of statutory direction can leave extreme needs cases contingent on judicial discretion. That tension is exactly the kind of issue you would expect 2026 consultation to address.

Conclusion: a jurisdiction preparing for change

2025 has delivered a rare degree of doctrinal consolidation. Standish clarifies the limits of sharing. Nuptial agreement jurisprudence now reads like an unofficial draft Bill. And conduct has become more visible.

But viewed collectively, the caselaw, whether it intends to or not, also makes the underlying point: the law has become too complex, too reactive and too dependent on judicial discretion to remain untouched. With the Government now looking to consult on binding nuptial agreements, codification of principles, cohabitation rights, the role of conduct amongst others, 2026 may be the most consequential year for financial remedies in decades.

If 2025 was the year the courts prepared the intellectual ground, 2026 may be the year Parliament chooses to act.

Liam Kelly

Deans Court Chambers

[1] https://lawcom.gov.uk/news/law-commission-publishes-scoping-report-on-financial-remedies-on-divorce/

[2] https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2025-11-10/debates/1492EA41-F82F-4148-A8AB-C0F8CB5B78B7/FinancialProvisionOnDivorce?utm_source=chatgpt.com (at 8.22pm)

[3] For more insight as to “community property” see Mark Cammack’s article in the 2007 Washington and Lee Law Review “Marital Property in California and Indonesia: Community Property and Harta Bersama”: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol64/iss4/7/

[4] https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20250109111230mp_/https://cloud-platform-e218f50a4812967ba1215eaecede923f.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/sites/30/2015/03/lc343_matrimonial_property.pdf

[5] https://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/project/fair-shares-sorting-out-money-and-property-on-divorce

[6] https://resolution.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Resolution_DAFRP_Report_ONLINE.pdf