Children Law Update

I will begin this summer’s update with a Peter Jackson LJ judgment on appeal: because what better way to start the summer? Re R (A Child: Leave to Oppose Adoption) [2026] EWCA Civ 673 was a hearing of a permission to appeal application made by the mother. It related to a decision of a Circuit Judge in refusing an application for leave to oppose an adoption order in relation to one child, A, aged almost 3. Having refused the leave application, the Judge went on to make an adoption order. 

The background to the case involved care proceedings in which the Judge had made significant and serious findings including neglect, sexual harm, physical and emotional harm, aggression and violence in the household, and failure by each adult to protect the children. These included findings that the mother had repeatedly abused her children, neglected them, and caused sexual harm to the elder 3 children by way of exposure to sexual activity and access to sexually explicit materials. A placement order was made in relation to A at the conclusion of the care proceedings. A was then matched with prospective adopters and after the adoption application was filed, the parents sought leave to oppose the adoption order. 

At the leave to oppose hearing, the Judge refused the mother leave. He referred to there being a two-stage process: ‘Have you made significant changes? … And even if you have, and even if the Court gives you permission to oppose the making of the order, the Court then got to consider, in light of all the material, whether it is in the welfare interest of the child for that to take place’. The Judge went on to conclude that:

‘Placing the child in their care would cause considerable worry and concern, but that is not the test that I am applying. That the reality is, has the mother shown that there has been significant change in her circumstances and those of the father, that she has undertaken some work, I have no doubt. That it does not have any real effect upon her thinking, her processing, her understanding is inevitable not only from the papers, but also from what the mother tells me. Therefore, the mother's application and the father's application for permission to oppose the making of the adoption order is refused.’

He therefore refused the leave to oppose application on the basis that the mother failed to satisfy the first stage of the test. He went on to make an adoption order. 

Dealing with the application for permission to appeal, Peter Jackson LJ first set out a helpful summary of the case law relating to leave to oppose applications:

-There has been a consistent approach to the application of these provisions for years, as seen in In re P [2007] EWCA Cib 616; In re B-S (Children)(Adoption Order: Leave to Oppose [2013] EWCA Cib 1146) ; and In re M (A Child) [2023] EWCA Cib 404 . In the last of these decisions, I summarised matters in this way: 

(1) Section 47 is "intended to provide a real and meaningful remedy… it should not be too narrowly applied": [8], and [70]-[72] of Re B-S.

(2) An application for leave to oppose involves a two-stage process. There is first the "threshold" question of whether there has been a change of circumstances, and second the "broad evaluation" of whether leave should be granted in light of the child's welfare: [9], summarising Re P.

(3) In cases where there has been a change in circumstances, the two stages will become "intertwined" and the court will use its assessment of the relevant change as part of the welfare assessment. That said, there will be cases where, notwithstanding sufficient change for the purposes of the first stage, it will be quite inadequate to cause the court to revisit the plan for adoption: [10].

(4) At the first stage, the asserted change must be relevant to the grant of leave and "of a degree sufficient, on the facts of the particular case, to open the door to the exercise of the judicial discretion to permit the parents to defend the adoption proceedings". There is no requirement for the s 47(7) change in circumstances to be 'significant' and "the test should not be set so high so as to be unachievable": [12], summarising Re P at [30]-[32].

(5) There is also no requirement for the change to be "unexpected or unforeseen" (paragraphs [14]-[16]). More generally, there is no reason to add any gloss to the simple language of section 47(7): [16(1)].

(6) The evaluation at the second stage must take account of all the circumstances and, in particular, (a) the parent's ultimate prospect of success if they are granted leave and (b) the impact on the child if the parent is given leave: [20], citing [74] of Re B-S. 'Prospect of success' refers to the prospect of successfully resisting the making of an adoption order and not the prospect of the child being returned to the parent (ibid), although there will be cases where adoption and rehabilitation are the only possible outcomes so that the distinction collapses: [22]. 

(7) In summary, the essential question at the second stage is this: "Taking account of all the circumstances and giving paramount consideration to this child's lifelong welfare, should the court revisit the plan for adoption that it approved when making the placement order?": [23]

His Lordship then went on to set out he practice guidance relating to the listing of adoption final hearings:

‘Application for leave to oppose

11 The court shall never list the parent's application for leave to oppose the adoption application, and the final hearing of the adoption application on the same day.

12 If an application for leave to oppose the adoption is listed and determined, and is unsuccessful, the court may then list the application for final hearing.

13 No fewer than 21days shall elapse between the refusal of leave and the listing of the final hearing (McFarlane LJ in In re B (A Child) [2013]) (which is now likely to be the final adoption hearing). It is not appropriate to abbreviate this time-period.

14 While it may be possible for the judge to indicate, when dismissing an application for leave to oppose an adoption application, that an adoption order is likely, on the basis of the current information, to be pronounced at the next hearing (see Sir James Munby P in In re W (A Child) (Adoption Order: Leave to Oppose) (Practice Note), para 30; In re W (Adoption: Procedure: Conditions) [2016] 1 FLR 454), it should not be forgotten that at the listed final hearing it is still open to another party (i e one who has not been refused permission to oppose the adoption application) to "attend . . . and, subject to paragraph (2), be heard on the question of whether an order should be made: rule 14.16.’

Addressing the mother’s application, Peter Jackson LJ stepped back and observed the leave to oppose application to have been ‘a very weak one’. It was however the case that the Judge had added the word ‘significant’ into the first stage of the test, albeit this did not constitute a misdirection that rendered the judgment flawed in its conclusions:

‘I start with the framing of the test at the first stage. This is not a formal ground of appeal, but it is true that the judge stated four times that the applicant had to show "significant" change. As he will have known, that formulation has been disapproved in decisions going back to 2007 on the basis that the statue contains no such intensifier and that birth parents should not be discouraged from improving themselves. The repeated use of the word was therefore inapt. However, I do not consider that it had any effect on the substance of the decision, for the following reasons. 

First, because the judgment and the surrounding transcript must be read as a whole, with an awareness of the conditions in which the hearing was taking place. Second, because the judge found that the work on which the applicant relied had not had "any real effect upon her thinking, her processing, her understanding" (my emphasis). Third, because he refused the application because "there is not sufficient change". Taken together, these matters show that the judge was applying the correct test or at least that the misdescriptions did not lead to any error of substance.’

His Lordship did however, in giving reasoning for refusing the permission to appeal application, refer to it as being unfortunate that the Judge had not given a clear view of the merits of the application for the purposes of the second stage of the test:

‘It is however unfortunate that the judge did not go on to express a clear view about the merits of the application at the second stage. That he had a clear view of them is evident: 

"… there would be a considerable hurdle for this mother and father to overcome bearing in mind the welfare test would then have to be applied in determining what should happen, and that A has lived effectively with her prospective adopters from her birth."

Despite that, he stated in terms that he was not deciding the application on that basis. 

In cases where a court that is refusing leave to oppose at the first stage also considers that the application would also fail at the second stage, it has for some years been good practice to state that conclusion, giving brief reasons, as an alternative basis for the decision. That practice should be followed in all cases where the court feels it to be appropriate. By drawing attention to the welfare of the child, it enables applicants to have a wider understanding of why their application has not succeeded. Further, if there is an appeal against the decision at the first stage, it may be important for the parties and the appeal court to know what the judge would have decided at the second stage. In some cases an appeal may have to be allowed and an adoption order set aside because the court has not taken this belt and braces approach. 

In the present case, the judge could, and in my view should, have said that, on the assumption that he was wrong about change of circumstances, the application would have failed at the second stage. The prospects of the birth parents successfully opposing the making of an adoption order lacked any solidity and there could be no possible welfare benefit to A in giving them leave to pursue their entrenched opposition at the final hearing. It was, in short, a very clear case in which birth parents had failed to satisfy the court that the plan for adoption should be revisited, and the judge should have said so.’

In concluding the judgment, His Lordship went on to address the making of the adoption order at the leave to oppose hearing, which was done in contravention to the practice guidance:

‘The making of the adoption order at the same time as the decision on the application for leave to oppose was procedurally irregular. The local authority should not have asked the judge to make the order and he should not have made it, particularly as the birth parents were quite likely to want to take the matter further. 

As Re W shows, there are several reasons why the Guidance must be followed in almost every foreseeable circumstance. First, an adoption order is the most fundamental order in the court's repertoire and there is no excuse for procedural informality. Second, because birth parents are entitled to exercise their right to seek permission to appeal in accordance with the rules, and they should not have to fall back on an appeal process to vindicate that right. Third, it avoids a final adoption order having to be set side if an appeal from the interlocutory leave to oppose order should succeed. Fourth and in consequence, disregard of the Guidance may overshadow an important time in the lives of two families, by creating painful anxiety for adopters and unfairly raising the hopes of birth parents. Take the present case, where the appeal process has taken four months and shifted the focus from where it ought to have been. The birth parents have not had to use this time to grieve A's formal adoption, and the adopters and their family have not been able to unconditionally celebrate A becoming a full member of their family. Matters might have been worse still if the applicant had not made her application to this court so promptly, as a later application for permission to appeal out of time would doubtless have caused anxiety, even if an extension of time was refused. 

Had the judge's decision on leave to oppose an appeal been set aside on appeal, the adoption order would necessarily have been set aside: Re W at [28-29]. However, in circumstances where permission to oppose was correctly refused and where the applicant has had a full opportunity to put her case before this court, I do not consider it arguable that the procedural irregularity led to any substantive injustice. On the contrary, it would be unjust to the adopters and to A if this unwitting error led to the need for the adoption order to be set aside and remade. The application also fails on this ground.’

One thing we can all take from this judgment is the importance of rigorously complying with the practice guidance when it comes to hearings within adoption proceedings. A failure to do so could feasibly result in things going very wrong at some point further down the line.

Next up is Re L (A Child: Placement and Contact Orders) [2026] EWCA Civ 639, a Peter Jackson LJ judgment in an appeal (which was allowed) against a recorder’s refusal to make a placement order. This is another example of a case in which the court at first instance has fallen into error in refusing to authorise an adoptive care plan and instead leaning towards long-term foster care as a welfare outcome for a very young child. The facts in brief were that A was aged 1 ½ at the time of the final hearing and 4 brothers aged between 7-13. The local authority sought care orders in relation to all 5 children and a placement order in relation to A only. The recorder judged that the importance for A of the sibling and parental bonds outweighed the benefits of adoption and refused to make a placement order because he was not satisfied that these important relationships would be retained if an order was made. The local authority sought to appeal.

Within the judgment, Peter Jackson LJ recited parts the evidence provided by both a clinical psychologist and the children’s social worker in relation to A. The social worker had considered long-term foster care as an option for A but discounted it, namely due to what she described as A’s need for ‘permanence that is both legal and relational to support her healthy development into childhood and beyond’. The social worker had provided an analysis of both factors in favour and factors against adoption. Refreshingly, the care plan for A recommended direct contact with her parents, post-adoption, once per year and family time with her siblings at least 4 times per year: His Lordship described the care plan as ‘a thoughtful and informative document’. He also described the guardian’s analysis as ‘a model of its kind’. In other words, the professional evidence relating to the positive and negative aspects of adoption on a welfare basis was particularly detailed and balanced. 

The final hearing was dominated by the question of whether the 5 children could safely return to the parents. The recorder was satisfied that this was not possible but having applied the welfare checklists under both the CA 1989 and the ACA 2002, concluded that adoption was not appropriate for A and refused to make the placement order in relation to A. He granted the care order.

In allowing the appeal, Peter Jackson LJ began by reminding practitioners that in cases where a placement order is pursued, the checklist under the ACA should be applied, not the CA welfare checklist:

‘In a case where the court is considering applications for both a care order and a placement order, the welfare analysis for that child takes place under this section, because the orders that might be made include a placement order: ss.1(1) and 1(7)(a) ACA 2002. In such a case, recourse to s.1 CA 1989 is inappropriate and may lead to error. 

This approach has been established and approved in several decisions of this court: Re C (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 1257 per Sir Andrew McFarlane P at [29-31]; Re B (A Child) (Adequacy of Reasons) [2022] EWCA Civ 40 per Sir Andrew McFarlane P at [33-42]; and Re J (Care Plan for Adoption) [2024] EWCA Civ 265, per Baker LJ at [24]. For a fuller explanation, I would draw attention to this passage in Re B: 

"40. … Whilst, when making a placement for adoption order under ACA 2002, s 21, a court will normally also make a care order, the placement application, and not the CA 1989, s 31 application, is the primary application before the court. It is not merely unnecessary for the court to consider the care application on its own, and before turning to the placement order application, it is wrong to do so and may readily lead to the error in the choice of statutory welfare requirements into which the judge fell.

41. ACA 2002, s 21(2) stipulates that the court may not make a placement order unless: 

a) the child is subject to a care order,

b) the court is satisfied that the conditions in CA 1989, s 31(2) are met, or

c) the child has no parent or guardian. 

The need for the s 31 threshold to be crossed is therefore expressly incorporated within the ACA 2002 process, and there is no need for there to be a separate evaluation by hiving off the CA 1989, s 31 application and dealing with this first. 

42. Where a court has reached the stage of determining that a placement for adoption order should be made, and parental consent should be dispensed with, the grounds for making a care order will be plainly made out. As a placement for adoption order under ACA 2002, s 21 gives parental authority to the local authority (as an adoption agency) [ACA 2002, s 25(2)] the question may be asked whether it is necessary also to make a care order at that time. The established practice in the Family Court of making a care order alongside a placement order is, in my view, sound. Where a care order is made at the same time as a placement for adoption order, the care order will, in effect, be dormant and the dominant provision will be the placement order. Where, however, a placement order is not converted into an adoption order, but is subsequently revoked under ACA 2002, s 24... it is likely to be of benefit to the child and the orderly conduct of any future proceedings for the care order to be in place. Not to have a care order where one is required to control the child's care arrangements following revocation of a placement order, would entail the local authority making a fresh s 31 application at that time." 

His Lordship held that the recorder’s welfare analysis relating to the elder siblings was firmly rooted in the evidence, however in relation to A:

‘In A's case, however, I regret that the welfare analysis went awry, both in substance and in structure:

(1) A stand-out feature of the welfare checklist was "the child's particular needs". A is an infant at a critical stage of attachment formation, and on any view the greatest of her particular needs was what Ms McConnell described as "permanence that is both legal and relational to support her healthy development into childhood and beyond": in other words, she needed a home and a family to grow up in. The need was identified by all the professional witnesses, and there was no reason to undervalue it. However, the judgment contains only a brief reference at [184] to "a forever family and stability", describing it as a benefit rather than a need.

(2) In the same way, there was no robust assessment of how long-term fostering could meet A's need for permanence. No party promoted it, and such evidence as there was about it was all one way and uncontested. As Ms McConnell said, foster care would provide stability in the short term, but it would not guarantee A the permanence and family identity of adoption. The recorder recorded at [184] that "as a long term fostered child she would remain in the care system and be subject to all the bureaucracy and reviews with no certainty that her carers would remain the same", but he did not examine that prospect more closely. For example, that there was no information about how long A could stay with her current short term carers, because nobody had contemplated that her third home would be another foster placement. Equally, attention needed to be given to A's longer-term vulnerability to all the uncertainties surrounding her brothers leaving care, whenever that may be. If they chose to return home on reaching majority or even before, A's position as a fostered child might become more and more exposed, wherever her true welfare interests lay. For that reason, Ms Fincham's submission that the other children may return to one or both of the parents at some unspecified time is a double-edged sword, and in my view one side of the blade is much sharper for A than the other. 

(3) The sequence in which the decisions were reached is seen at [183]: 

"Having decided that it is too risky for any of the children to live with the parents at this time, I am drawn to make a care order in A's case for the reasons set out above. Should I go on to make a placement order?" 

For the reasons given above, it was an error of approach to have settled on a care order under CA 1989 before considering the application for a placement order under ACA 2002. It distracted attention from the care plan that was before the court, and led to a process whereby the parents and adoption were successively excluded, leaving only long term fostering. 

(4) In consequence, a care order was made without a corresponding care plan, and the court was unable to consider the permanence provisions for A's future, as required. Further, where a court takes a different view from a local authority, the next step is for the court to invite the authority to reconsider: see Re T (A Child) [2018] EWCA Civ 650, where this court reviewed the respective roles of the court and the local authority in this situation. At [42] I referred to the process of mutual respect under which: 

"… the family court cannot dictate to the local authority what its care plan is to be, any more than it can dictate to any other party what their case should be. What the court can, however, expect from a local authority is a high level of respect for its assessments of risk and welfare, leading in almost every case to those assessments being put into effect."

This important convention only works if the court has a well-founded plan of its own. Here, the court did not ask the local authority to reconsider its care plan and, if it had done so, it did not offer an evidenced alternative to which the authority could have been expected to defer. Deadlock or an appeal were therefore inevitable, with precious time passing for A. 

(5) The recorder did not consider the whole range of his powers, as required by s.1(6) ACA 2002. In his legal self-direction he referred to s.26 ACA 2002, but he did not bring it into the subsequent analysis. The local authority had left the door open to a contact order, but in any case the court had a duty to consider contact and the power to make it happen. The recorder did not explain his statement at [187] that he was unable to be satisfied that A's important relationships with her parents and siblings would be retained if a placement order was made. Such a statement might have been justified if the court had no power to make a contact order, but that was not so.’

His Lordship therefore allowed the appeal and substituted the dismissal of the placement order for a placement order. I found this judgment interesting as it acts as a stark reminder of the need to separate the two respective welfare checklists: in placement order applications, the ACA checklist should be applied and the recorder fell into error in making the care order before considering the placement order application. Of further interest is that Peter Jackson LJ also made an order for the local authority to facilitate sibling contact in line with its care plan: the importance of post-adoption direct family contact is again highlighted by the Court of Appeal. 

Moving on to another Peter Jackson LJ judgment (I am not deliberately selecting Peter Jackson LJ judgments only, but His Lordship does appear to have been pretty busy over the last few months) in Re M (A Child: Adoption: Duty of Disclosure) [2026] EWCA Civ 568. In this case the subject child, T, a boy aged 2, had been placed for adoption with a married couple and an adoption order was made in November 2025. The local authority sought to appeal that order and set it aside on the basis that the Court was misled about the true circumstances of the adopters. The appeal was allowed, the adoption order set aside, and T’s case remitted to the Family Court. 

The background to the case involved parental substance and alcohol misuse and T being placed in foster care from birth. The adopters, AM and AF, were approved as adopters in 2024 and matched with T in April 2025. T was made subject to an adoption order in November 2025. 

On 21 January 2026, T’s former social worker received information that the adopters had separated and that AM was in a relationship with a male prisoner at a prison where she worked. Investigations followed and the following information was obtained:

-AF had moved out of the home in mid-October 2025 to live with his parents.

-On the day the adoption order was made, the council tax office was informed that AF had moved out of the family home.

-The prisoner was in custody for a drug-related offence. His offending history included battery, possession of weapons, and drug offences. He had also been accused of sexual offending in respect of a child, but no further action had been taken.

-He had given AM’s address as the address to which he was to be released, his release date being 3 March 2026. 

-He had since October 2025 referred to T as his ‘stepson’.

-AM had taken T to visit the prisoner in late November 2025, and again on 13 February 2026. 

-AM had initially denied any relationship with the prisoner, but on the following day she admitted it. 

-She had further initially denied that T had had any contact with AM.

-AM had been caring for the prisoner's XL bully dog.

-AF began divorce proceedings in February 2026.

The local authority in whose area T now lived issued care proceedings and an ICO was granted with T being removed from AM and placed with AF’s parents. The local authority which brought the original care proceedings (‘LA1’) then sought to appeal the adoption order. The essential basis of the appeal was that the decision to make an adoption order was founded on a mistaken factual basis due to the failure of the adoptive parents to disclose key information to the Court. I am going to set out the key parts of His Lordship’s analysis in full below, as it really requires full reading:

‘Adoption proceedings are therefore a very particular form of procedure in which the court is performing an essentially supervisory role. Its ability to make the right order for the child depends heavily upon the good faith and efficient cooperation of its informants, including social workers, referees and, above all, prospective adopters. Most prospective adopters will have come through a rigorous process of assessment and training and can be in no doubt about the gravity of the commitment that they are undertaking, and its importance to the child. In all these circumstances, each prospective adopter is under a clear duty to the court to make full and frank disclosure about their circumstances at every stage of the process up to the making of the adoption order. That duty will be breached if the court is misled by a prospective adopter's words, deeds or silence. 

The existence of such a general duty in care proceedings and adoption proceedings has been described as "a proposition which is self-evident to anybody with any secure grasp of the fundamentals": Re B, R & C (Children) [2002] EWCA Civ ; [2003] Fam. Law 305, per Thorpe LJ at [34]. Earlier, he said this: 

"25. Equally, it was or should have been obvious beyond discussion that… there is upon parties to public law Children Act proceedings a general duty of full and frank disclosure. The proposition is so obvious as to scarcely require authority. Not only is that plain from a clear line of cases, both in relation to Children Act proceedings and also in relation to adoption proceedings, but also there is a Practice Direction in being, as the local authority have emphasised in their written submissions. 

…

27..  The Practice Direction, to which I have referred, is to be found at [1995] 1 FLR 456 . The Practice Direction was issued by Sir Stephen Brown, President, on 31 January 1995. It is necessary only to record paragraph 4:

"It is a duty owed to the court both by the parties and by their legal representatives to give full and frank disclosure in ancillary relief applications and also in all matters in respect of children.""

For the reasons given above, and because of the momentous effect of an adoption order, the duty is of critical importance in adoption proceedings. 

A failure to be frank with other parties or the court has led to successful out-of-time appeals to this court in several reported instances, including:

• In re F (R) (An Infant) [1970] 1 QB 385: inaccurate representation by prospective adopters that the birth mother could not be found.
  • Re M (Minors) (Adoption) [1991] 1 FLR 458: a father's consent to a step-parent adoption was vitiated by mistake when given in ignorance of the mother's terminal illness.
  • Re K (Adoption and Wardship) [1997] 2 FLR 221: the failure to give proper notice to child's extended family or state-appointed guardian was a fundamental breach of natural justice.
  • What this case is about?
  • What evidence have I considered?
  • What are the real issues in the case?
  • What are the relevant legal principles?
  • What has happened since the case came to court
  • My conclusions with regard to [the mother's] mental health
  • My conclusions with respect to domestic abuse?
  • Some positive developments
  • The route to Canada
  • The timeline for stranger adoption
  • A different approach for F
  • Separating the children
  • What is in the children's welfare interests?
  • Balancing these points
  • My conclusions.

A more recent example is found in Re J (A Child) (Adoption: Non-party Appeal) [2018] EWFC8. Step-parent adopters had concealed the birth father's identity and whereabouts and an unopposed adoption order was made by magistrates. Three years later, when the father became aware, he appealed out of time to the High Court. Cobb J allowed the appeal and set aside the adoption order, describing it at [18] as having been predicated on incomplete and essentially false information. He continued:

"23. It is plain from all that I have said that each one of the three Grounds of Appeal presented by F, as set out at [22] above, are unchallengeable. The professionals were unable to conduct their statutory enquiries, and the magistrates were materially misled about J's background history, his paternity, and F's interest in J. The court was thus rendered unable, by virtue of M and SF's misconduct, to reach a completely informed or reliable view about the appropriateness of the adoption in J's best interests. The outcome of the hearing was in my view clearly "unjust" because of the "serious… irregularity" which I have described above (rule 30.12(3)(b) FPR 2010). Rightly, the rules compel me in the circumstances to allow the appeal. Having regard to the views of the parties, and of J himself (who, as it happens, has recently told a social worker that he wishes to be "unadopted"), I propose to set aside the adoption order."

In further remarks that may resonate in this case, he continued:

"30. … Applicants for adoption can be assumed to act responsibly and with integrity. But of course, there are those, as here, who do not. Professionals can only work with the information they receive, and if parties are determined to pull the wool over professional eyes, and encourage others (friends and/or family members) to do the same, only through conscientious detective work on the part of the social worker will the deceit ever be likely to be unearthed.

…

33. Proceeding only on partial information had the effect of materially undermining the integrity of the order by which SF became J's legal father. The Respondents recognise this and rightly do not raise any obstacle to the outcome contended for by F. I am driven inexorably to the conclusion that the adoption order was wrongly made.

34. As I made clear at the hearing of this application and appeal, I view the conduct of M and SF as disgraceful. They deliberately set out to undermine the solemnity and gravity of the adoption process, with its extraordinary life-long implications for all concerned, and they manipulated the outcome by their multiple deceptions. More significantly they knowingly concealed from the court F's actual or at least potential Article 8 rights to family life with his son, and indeed proper involvement or participation in a legal process by which his son would become, in law, the son of another. They should be, as I believe they are, utterly ashamed of their behaviour."

In their different ways, these cases involved misrepresentations made by prospective adopters to or about members of the birth family, and ultimately misrepresentations to the court. In the present case the adoptive parents withheld crucial information about the state of their own relationships from T's adoption agency (LA1), from their own adoption agency, and from the court. The degree of responsibility that each adoptive parent and the members of their wider families may bear for this state of affairs will no doubt become more apparent in the ongoing care proceedings, and it would not be right for us to say more about that. What is entirely clear, and sufficient for the orders that we must make, is that the misinformation about the state of the adult relationships within T's new family fundamentally undermined the court's decision. The judge would certainly not have made an adoption order to joint applicants on 21 November 2025 if she had had doubts about the stability of their relationship or if she had had any hint of AM's relationship with the prisoner. Had the true facts been known, she would either have dismissed the adoption application (if it was pursued) or would at least have caused further inquiries to be made. 

As the grounds of appeal show, the situation that has arisen can be analysed in a number of ways. On appeal to this court, an appeal will be allowed where the decision of the lower court was (a) wrong; or (b) unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court: CPR 52.21(3). In my view, both of these conditions are met in this case. The fresh evidence that has been admitted on appeal shows that: 

(1) On the basis of the true facts that existed at the time of the hearing, an adoption order was the wrong order; 

and that

(2) The failure by the prospective adopters to make full and frank disclosure of their circumstances amounted to a serious irregularity in the proceedings that rendered them unjust (not a commonplace procedural irregularity but an 'other irregularity' of a kind envisaged by the rule).

The consequence of each of these errors was that the court acted on a fundamentally mistaken basis. There was of course no fault on the part of the judge: on the basis of the information before her, every judge in the Family Court would have made an adoption order, while on the basis of the true facts, no judge could have done so.

As we are not aware of the nature and extent of the prospective adopters' misrepresentations in the present case, or of the steps that were taken by professionals in the run-up to the hearing, I would not wish to suggest that the process that was followed was inadequate or that further steps would have revealed further information. However, this case underlines the need for social workers and the court to ensure that the information provided to the court at the final hearing is fully up to date, particularly in cases where the Annex A report is completed some time before the hearing and when the prospective adopters' attendance at court has been excused. 

For these reasons, I joined in the decision to allow the appeal, set aside the adoption order and dismiss the adoption application. T accordingly ceases to be a member of his adoptive family and reverts to being a member of his birth family. Further, as a result of the setting aside of the adoption order, AM and AF no longer have parental responsibility for T, and the care and placement orders in favour of LA1 revive: Re W (A Child) [2010] EWCA Civ 1535 at [12]. The placement order gives LA1 parental responsibility as an adoption agency, with the power to determine the extent to which the exercise of parental responsibility by T's birth parents is to be restricted: ACA 2002 s. 25(2) and (4). A further effect of the placement order is to render the care order as being of no effect while the placement order is in force: ACA 2022 s. 29(1).’

So a very unusual case and a fascinating judgment from PJLJ. It also makes you wonder exactly how much scrutiny is given the prospective adopters in some areas.

Finally I turn to a Baker LJ judgment in Re F, G & H (Return Home Under Supervision Order) [2026] EWCA Civ 713. This was an appeal from care proceedings relating to 3 girls, with the central risk issues relating to parental domestic abuse and the mother’s mental health. The mother was detained under s.2 of the MHA 1983, resulting in the children being accommodated in foster care. Within the care proceedings the mother undertook work around domestic abuse and made a number of improvements identified by professionals. At the final hearing the local authority sought to place the eldest child in long-term foster care and sought placement orders in relation to the younger two children with a view to placing them for adoption with a paternal aunt in Canada under the 1993 Hague Convention. The mother sought the return of the children to her care and the Guardian supported the making of care orders but considered that there should be a ‘clear route map’ towards the elder returning to the mother’s care within around three months, accompanied by the discharge of the care order on such a return. With regard to the younger children, the Guardian considered that it was premature to proceed with a plan for adoption and invited the court to dismiss the application for placement orders. Given concerns about delays associated with adoption under the Convention, it was the Guardian’s view that the mother’s ability to care for the children should be reviewed first, before proceeding with a plan for adoption.

The Judge at first instance considered that the children should return to the care of the mother with a package of support. He identified the risk factors and the protective factors present and took the view that a phased transition under a supervision plan could be done linked to the children remaining in foster care in the interim pursuant to s.20, which the mother consented to. The Judge also made a non-molestation order against the father. A 2-year supervision order was made. The local authority sought to appeal.

Eagle eyed readers may have already noted the fact that the supervision order was made for 2 years. In this respect, Baker LJ made the following comments:

‘The "approved final order" also contained an error. As noted above, it provided that the supervision order would remain in force for two years. But under paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 3 to the 1989 Act, subject to other provisions in the Act, "a supervision order shall cease to have effect at the end of the period of one year beginning with the date on which it was made". Paragraphs 6(3) and (4) permit the court, on the application of the supervising local authority, to extend, or further extend, the supervision order, but the order may not be extended beyond the end of the period of three years beginning with the date on which it was made. A judge faced with the restriction in paragraph 6(1) sometimes indicates when making the order for one year that they anticipate that it may be extended under paragraph 6(3), but they cannot initially make the order for a longer period.

I know from experience that this is the sort of detail that a judge may inadvertently overlook. Here, however, there were two puzzling features. The first is that none of the parties pointed out the error to the judge. The second is that, in addition to the final order approved by the judge, the court office also issued a separate order, headed "Supervision order", stating that "the Court orders [the local authority] supervises the children until 20 March 2027". At the hearing before us, there was no explanation for the second order, which correctly limited the duration of the supervision order to one year. I speculated that the Family Public Law Portal, instructed to generate a supervision order, had done so automatically in accordance with how it had been programmed. Following the hearing before us, we were informed by the parties that, on inquiry with the court office, this was indeed what had happened. This throws up the not uninteresting question of the status of such an order generated by the digitised system which is right in law but contrary to what the judge has unlawfully ordered.’

By the time of the appeal hearing the eldest child had returned home, hence the local authority only advanced its appeal in relation to the younger two children. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, with Baker LJ dismissing the criticisms made by the local authority of the Judge’s failure to provide sufficient detail within his welfare analysis. Helpfully His Lordship reminds us of the locus classicus of Peter Jackson LJ (who else?) in respect of what a judgment should contain (google tells me that locus classicus is Latin for ‘classic source):

‘In the context of proceedings relating to children, the locus classicus is now the judgment of Peter Jackson LJ in Re B (A Child) (Adequacy of Reasons) [2022] EWCA Civ 407 where, at paragraph 59, he observed that 

"a good judgment will in its own way, at some point and as concisely as possible:

(1) state the background facts

(2) identify the issue(s) that must be decided

(3) articulate the legal test(s) that must be applied

(4) note the key features of the written and oral evidence, bearing in mind that a judgment is not a summing-up in which every possibly relevant piece of evidence must be mentioned

(5) record each party's core case on the issues

(6) make findings of fact about any disputed matters that are significant for the decision

(7) evaluate the evidence as a whole, making clear why more or less weight is to be given to key features relied on by the parties

(8) give the court's decision, explaining why one outcome has been selected in preference to other possible outcomes."

Peter Jackson LJ continued:

"60. The last two processes – evaluation and explanation – are the critical elements of any judgment. As the culmination of a process of reasoning, they tend to come at the end, but they are the engine that drives the decision, and as such they need the most attention. A judgment that is weighed down with superfluous citation of authority or lengthy recitation of inessential evidence at the expense of this essential reasoning may well be flawed. At the same time, a judgment that does not fairly set out a party's case and give adequate reasons for rejecting it is bound to be vulnerable."

In expressing these views, Peter Jackson LJ, whilst emphasising the crucial importance of every judgment having a structure, was at pains to acknowledge that judgments "reflect the thinking of the individual judge and there is no room for dogma". I would add that all judges develop their own style in writing judgments – some more "unconventional", even "idiosyncratic" – and it is no business of this Court to be prescriptive about how they go about it, provided the end result meets the requirements set out above. 

The judgment under consideration here had a strikingly clear structure. It was composed under a series of headings: 

It will be seen that these headings manifestly covered the ground identified in Re B.’ 

So, there you have it from the Court of Appeal: a neat summary of exactly what a judgment should contain. Baker LJ concluded that the judge had carried out a sufficiently analytical balancing exercise in this case. In dealing with the supervision order, instead of setting the order aside and replacing it with an order of 1-year’s duration, the Court requested that the local authority bring the error to the Judge’s attention, with the Judge then being able to amend the final order accordingly. 

That brings this summer’s case law update to a close. Hopefully I will be able to bring you another interesting update in Autumn, in order to lift those post-summer blues. In the meantime, I hope everyone has a suitably amazing holiday break.