Blackpool Borough Council v Langley and Ors (No.3) (Publication of Judgments) [2026] EWHC 1100 (Fam)

A stellar cast from Deans Court Chambers appeared before Mr Justice McDonald in the case of Blackpool Borough Council v Langley and Ors (No.2) (re-opening of Findings) [2026] EWFC 69. The case concerned the welfare of RR following the sad death of her sister Edith in 2020. The court was concerned with whether or not Edith’s mother had inflicted injuries upon Edith causing her death. 

In 2023, the family court made findings that Edith’s death was caused as a result of compressive chest trauma inflicted upon her by her mother. 

In October 2023, the matter came for criminal trial, the mother having been charged with murder. A conflict of medical opinion as between experts during that trial lead to the Jury being discharged so that the expert medical evidence could be reviewed. This led to the prosecution deciding not to proceed with the counts on the indictment due to conflicting expert opinions. In November 2024, the Crown offered no evidence and the mother’s acquittal of Edith’s murder was directed. 

In 2025 the family court granted the mother’s application to re-open the findings of fact made in the family proceedings in relation to Edith’s death; with a principle focus on the re-hearing of expert evidence. This resulted in the court again finding that Edith’s death was caused as a result of compressive chest trauma inflicted on her by her mother and that the mother was responsible for the death of Edith. 

The case is a fascinating and compelling insight into the treatment of conflicting evidence by high-profile experts, criticisms of the conduct of expert witnesses and complex evidence in relation to bone fractures in infants which merits reading in its own right.

I was pleased to join the matter on behalf of the father, led by Julia Cheetham KC, in relation to argument as to whether the judgments in the matter should be anonymised prior to publication and if so, to what extent. 

A Transparency Order in force during the proceedings prohibited inter alia publication of any information likely to identify the child as a subject child of the proceedings, and the name of the mother. 

The mother sought, in reliance on a respect for hers and RR’s private life, protection by means of anonymisation of the judgment of the court to include removal of: her name; reference to her HIV status; RR’s name; the name of the Local Authority, and the name of the hospital that treated Edith. The other parties made competing claims for the publication of those elements (save for RR’s name and the father’s name) in support of rights to freedom of expression. 

Allowing publication such that a link could be made explicitly between the family and criminal proceedings (extensive information in relation to the latter being in the public domain) evidently would open up the identification of the mother and a likelihood of the subject child being identified. 

In summary, the court considered that there was an extremely strong public interest in the publication of information which would allow the link to be made between the judgment in the family proceedings and the extensive reporting which took place in relation to the criminal trial concerning Edith’s death. The court considered that this public interest outweighed considerations in relation to negative impacts upon the subject child RR and the mother. 

Issues of public interest included: 

1. The fact that the Family Court and the Crown Court reached different conclusions as to the perpetrator of fatal injuries sustained by a child is a matter of public interest; understanding the significance of the outcome of the family proceedings requires reference to the outcome of the criminal proceedings. Anonymising the mother’s name in the judgments of the family court would have the effect of cutting across the open justice principle. 

1. Allowing a fair and balanced understanding to be reached in relation to the expert opinion that had been put before both the criminal and family courts by Professor Charles Mangham, Consultant Histopathologist and Osteoarticular Pathologist. The tenor of the reporting in the criminal proceedings was that the evidence of one expert, Professor Mangham, was unreliable and had led potentially to miscarriages of justice, and the evidence of three other experts (McCarthy, Cohen and Freemont) had prevented a miscarriage of justice. In the family proceedings, the court found the position reversed. Professor Mangham’s evidence was found to be reliable and thorough during both family court hearings before Mr Justice McDonald in the proceedings concerning Edith, notwithstanding that Professor Mangham had been subject to criticism by Keehan J in the case of London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham v the mother and father [2024] EWHC 2200 (Fam) which had caused him to refer himself to the GMC. Mr Justice McDonald made a number of adverse conclusions with respect to the approach of Professors McCarthy, Freemont and Cohen. There was therefore a strong public interest in the public knowing how the court treated the expert evidence in this case, particularly in circumstances where that view differed from that taken in the criminal proceedings and, in respect of Professor Mangham, in other family proceedings. 

1. The ability to consider, holistically, the views of Professors McCarthy, Cohen and Freemont whose opinions favoured CPR as the cause of Edith’s multiple rib fractures and Professor McCarthy and Professor Cohen who opined that Edith’s bones were abnormal in a manner that predisposed her to fractures; Professor McCarthy positing a number of possible causes for this abnormality including the fact that Edith had been exposed, in utero, to the mother’s antiretroviral medication for HIV. This was rejected by Mr Justice McDonald. 

1. Overarching these matters, a public interest lay in accurate information being made available in a case resulting in the death of a child, rather than information that is partial and incomplete, which would be the case if no explicit link were able to be made between the outcomes of criminal and family proceedings concerning the same child due to a restriction on reporting of the mother’s name in these proceedings. 

Factors that played into the balancing falling down on the side of publication of sufficient detail that allowed the mother to be identified and the link to be made between the two cases included: 

1. The court noted that there was already extensive press coverage with respect to the mother and the death of Edith; both of whom were identifiable by simple internet search using minimal key words from the family judgment including ‘multiple infant rib fractures CPR’. This revealed a wealth of coverage including the hospital that treated Edith; each of the experts who gave evidence in the criminal proceedings; the results of Edith’s post mortem and photographs of the mother and Edith. Internet searches relating to Professor Mangham’s evidence in the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham case also led to press coverage relating to this mother and Edith.

1. Those who are closest to RR (family, neighbours and community) are most likely to know that RR is linked to this case regardless of anonymisation. 

1. The court considered written evidence from the social worker detailing the support to be put in place to assist RR to mitigate the impact of any renewed press in this case as a result of publication of judgments. The court considered that there was no evidence that RR had been impacted adversely by the extensive national press coverage accompanying her mother’s criminal trial and the court was satisfied that the risk of harm to RR of the mother’s name being included in the published judgment is low and that anonymising the mother’s name would not result in substantial further protection for RR. However the court considered continued anonymisation of RR’s name by way of a Transparency Order will provide a limited but important degree of protection by preventing RR’s name being linked in the future with reports of her sister’s death. 

In relation to the publication of the mother’s HIV positive status the court considered that: 

1. The mother’s HIV status is plainly private and she would have had a reasonable expectation that the information would remain private in circumstances where the information by its nature is confidential and the proceedings in which it was considered are private. The question then became whether there is sufficient public interest in publication of the mother’s HIV status in the judgment to justify curtailing the privacy of personal information (Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22]

1. In this case the mother used her HIV positive status through the deployment of the evidence of Professor McCarthy to seek to explain the cause of, and to support her denial of culpability for Edith’s death, asserting that antiretroviral drug lowers bone mineral density and impacted upon Edith’s skeletal fragility predisposing her to fractures. The court found that there is no basis for concluding that Edith was rendered susceptible to fractures by reason of her exposure to antiretroviral medication. The court considered that in order to be able to explain its reasoning for rejecting the mother’s case, it is necessary to refer to the mother’s HIV status and the consequential administration during pregnancy of antiretroviral medication and that information is equally necessary to meet the public interest in accurate information being made available in a case resulting in the death of a child. 

1. With respect to the impact on RR of her discovering her mother’s HIV status, that is to be the subject of careful work with RR to explain the position and the consequences. 

In addition and as usual Mr Justice McDonald provided an extremely thorough precis of the law in relation to publication and anonymisation. This is covered from paragraphs 20 - 60 in the judgment. In summary: 

1. s.12 Administration of Justice Act 1960; s.97 Children Act 1989 and Part 12, Chapter 7 Family Procedure rules (r.12.73) are engaged. 
2. The family courts have long expressed the view that the outcome of hearing held in private should be made public (subject to appropriate anonymisation). There is an inherent general public interest, not just to the professional readers of the law, in knowing how the family courts exercise their jurisdiction. re X, London Borough of Barnet v Y and X [2006] 2 FLr 998, Sir James Munby P. The court deriving its power under the inherent justification to order disclosure or all or part of what takes places in private family proceedings [Re C (A child) [2016] EWCA Civ 798]
3. The President’s Practice Guidance - Publication of Judgments (June 2024) articulates that there is a concerted move towards greater transparency, although the terms on which publication is permitted are a matter for the judge in every case and the court will need to consider whether an adjustment to the general approach/process set out in the guidelines is required. The general approach is intended to represent a reasonable starting point for the approach to the anonymisation of children judgments for the purposes of publication. 
4. That approach includes: 

1. The law in the family court is the same as in any other jurisdiction;
2. Anonymisation is only permissible where specifically justified; 
3. Anonymise/redact where necessary to protect the identity of the subject child/family members (as a function of the child’s Article 8 rights encompassing welfare); 
4. Anonymisation of professionals is only justified where its purpose is to ensure anonymisation of the child/family. Speculative concern about harassment/criticism is insufficient. 
5. Removal of one fact or item may obviate the need to redact a more important piece of information. 
6. Avoid prejudicing criminal investigation/proceedings. 
7. Take particular care in cases involving complaints or descriptions of sexual assault or abuse. 
8. Questions of publication of a judgment will be influenced by the options for anonymisation and redaction. 
9. In a decision on the publication of judgments a balancing exercise is required as between articles 6, 8 and 10 ECHR.

1. The law has recently undergone further and relevant development in Abbasi and another v Newcastle upon Tyne NHS Foundation Trust, Haastrup v King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2025] UKSC 15 (Abbasi). The Human Rights Act does not itself provide a cause of action and orders regulating the publication of information should be based on the relevant cause of action under domestic law (rather than HRA 1998 and s.37(1) of the Senior Courts Act). The causes of action available to protect rights relating to privacy include pursuant to the parens patriae jurisdiction of the court under its inherent jurisdiction deriving from the ‘right and duty of the Crown as parens patriae to take care of those who are not able to care of themselves’. The Supreme Court confirmed that where the child continues to live after proceedings have ended, the court retains its inherent jurisdiction as parens patriae to protect that child from adverse consequences of publication. 
2. Mr Justice McDonald observed that the court also has an inherent jurisdiction to regulate the publication of information arising from the court’s jurisdiction to control its own proceedings in the context of the principle of open justice (Cape intermediate Holdings v Dring) and this jurisdiction may be more apt as a cause of action when the court is considering publishing information rather than withholding information to protect the welfare of the subject child.
3. Therefore in summary an application for permission to publish information about proceedings heard in private is a matter of invoking the inherent jurisdiction, to be heard in the High Court (M v F and Anor [2025] EWHC 801 (Fam)). 

1. Mr Justice McDonald sets out the following useful summary at paragraph 60: 

“In the foregoing circumstances, I am satisfied that the following principles fall to be applied when determining the questions of whether the judgments should be anonymised prior to publication and the terms of the Transparency Order:

1. Section 12 of the 1960 Act operates to prohibit publication of information relating to proceedings before any court sitting in private. This prohibition continues after the conclusion of proceedings (s.97 of the Children Act 1989 provides a parallel prohibition whilst the proceedings in respect of the child are ongoing).
   1. Subject to the contents of the judgment, a decision to anonymise the judgment prior to publication, is likely to involve a decision whether to relax or enlarge the prohibition contained in s.12 of the 1960 Act.
   2. Pursuant to FPR PD12R, the court may make a Transparency Order, and may vary the terms of that order beyond the terms set out in FPR PD12R, the effect of which is to vary the restrictions in s.12 of the 1960 Act.
   3. The decision to restrict or enlarge the restrictions set out in s.12 of the 1960 Act is an exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction, be it the inherent parens patriae jurisdiction of the court or the court’s inherent jurisdiction to control the publication of information from its own proceedings.
   4. When deciding under the inherent jurisdiction whether to anonymise the judgment prior to publication, and when deciding whether to make or vary a Transparency Order, the court should begin its assessment by considering the relevant domestic law. Namely, is the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction necessary to safeguard the welfare of the subject child or for safeguarding her rights and / or to ensure the administration of justice.
   5. Where the inherent jurisdiction is exercised on basis of the court’s ‘protective’ jurisdiction in respect of the child, the child’s best interests are not paramount. Where the court is exercising its inherent jurisdiction on the basis of the court’s ‘custodial’ jurisdiction in respect of the child, the child’s interests are paramount.
   6. The question of whether a judgment should be anonymised and published engages the principle of open justice.
   7. It is doubtful that a judge sitting in the Family Court has power to restrain reporting of a criminal trial and even if having that power, should not exercise it.
   8. When deciding under the inherent jurisdiction whether to anonymise the judgment prior to publication, and when deciding whether to make or vary a Transparency Order, pursuant to s.6(1) of the 1998 Act the court must act in a manner compatible with the rights engaged under the Convention. The court must consider (a) whether there is an interference with the relevant right which is prescribed by the law, (b) whether it pursues a legitimate aim, i.e. an aim which can be justified with reference to one or more of the matters mentioned in the relevant article and (c) whether the interference is necessary in a democratic society.
   9. When deciding under the inherent jurisdiction whether to direct the publication of a judgment and whether to anonymise the judgment prior to publication, and when deciding whether to make or vary a Transparency Order, pursuant to s.6(1) of the 1998 Act, the need for any restriction of freedom of expression must be established convincingly. Where the information in question is of a journalistic nature, the court will have regard to the extent to which that information is already in the public domain or the extent to which it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published.
   10. As noted above, paragraph 8.5 of the President’s Guidance concerning publication of judgments contemplates brief reasons.”

In outline, all of the decisions concerning Edith and child RR demonstrate a cascade of complex issues with which the family court is required to grapple. Mr Justice McDonald distills difficult evidence into intelligible format for the reader. Honourable mention has to go to Mr Peter Rothery of these Chambers who represented the child throughout the long litigation instructed by Ms Alison Bone. He was complimented by Mr Justice McDonald in the following terms for his handling of the difficult expert material in the case “Mr Rothery’s chairing of the expert’s meetings was a model of controlled and impartial moderation that greatly assisted the court by clarifying and further illuminating the complex medical issues arising this case”. Reading the detail and difficulties that arose in the case, that was no mean feat. 

MOLLY GILES 

DEANS COURT CHAMBERS